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DEPARTMENT

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND TECHNIQUES IN
SOCIOLEGAL RESEARCH

The Indirect Experiment

The controlled experiment is undoubtedly the ideal instrument for
testing the effectiveness of a new rule of law or legal procedure: have
one random half of the cases operate under the new rule, the other half
under the old rule, and see what difference there is in the outcome.
The design is simple and clean, but not easily effected in the real
world of the law. To be sure, contro]led experiments can be conducted
under simulated conditions., There is also a marginal area of the law
where experimentation might meet little resistance. 2 On the whole,
however, the law is here very cautious, probably more than it needs to

be, because experimentation-involving, as it does, applying a rule to
some litigants and not to others-smacks, at least superficially, of discrimination, especially when this random division would have to be

made by order of a judge.
In such situations, politically and legally difficult, what one might
call the indirect experiment becomes a viable and therefore important
substitute s Perhaps the best way of explaining what is meant by an
indirect experiment is to describe one, although this particular experiment has never been carried out. It does not concern the law but a vexing
problem familiar to all: the question of whether smoking causes cancer.
There are those who stubbornly, and with some technical justification,
insist that the connection has not been proven. As long as one compares
smokers and non-smokers as they naturally arise in the population, the
1. See, for example, R. S. JAMES, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
2. See The Case for the Official Experiment in ZEISEL, KALVEN, BUCHHOLZ, DELAY
IN THE COURT ch. 21 (1959).
3. The idea was first developed to overcome not legal but factual obstacles to
experimentation. To test the effectiveness of television commercials, it is clearly impossible to have a random group of homes view the program while the control group
refrains from viewing. An indirect experiment was designed, making non-exposure the
experimental variable. See I. M. TOWERS, L. A. GOODMAN, H. ZEISEL, A METHOD OF
EXPERIMENTS 87-110 (No. 4, Studies in Public Communication, U. of Chicago, 1962).
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higher cancer rate of the smokers might be caused not by their smoking
but by some, possibly hidden, factor that causes both smoking and
cancer.
These skeptics say that only a controlled experiment could provide
the ultimate answer.4 Clearly, such an experiment, in which people are
randomly assigned to become smokers or non-smokers is not feasible; not
even in a prison population could such commands be enforced.
But an indirect experiment might work. Suppose we took two random
groups of smokers and then tried to persuade one group to reduce
smoking or give it up altogether. It would not matter how we achieved
our goal; we might persuade them, but we could also bribe them, pay
them for not smoking.
If we were at all successful in reducing smoking in the experimental
group, a subsequent differential incidence of cancer in the two groups
could then safely be attributed to the reduction in smoking, since this
was the only difference between the two groups.
In this design the direct control over the experimental variable has
been abandoned; but randomization has been retained by somewhat
blunting the experimental alternatives.
I shall now cite a few actual indirect experiments that have been
conducted within the province of the law. We might begin with the
bail experiment conducted in the Manhattan Supreme Court under the
guidance of the Vera Foundation.5
Its purpose was to test the hypothesis that a much larger part of the
defendants awaiting trial could be released without bail, on their personal recognizance, without substantially increasing the proportion of
defendants who fail to appear on their appointed day in court. The
direct experiment would have required the division of a group of defendants randomly, to impose bail on the one half, and release the other
half without bail. In view of the constitutional roots of the bail system,
this was an impossible procedure. Instead the following indirect experiment was put into action.
Vera staff members, after interviewing all defendants, were ready to
recommend some of them to the judge for release without bail. At that
point, they divided the group of recommendable defendants in two random halves: for the defendants in one group they transmitted the recom4. See The Cross-tabulation Explains in H. ZEISEL, SAY IT WITH FIGURES ch. 9
(5th ed. 1968).
5. See H. Zeisel, The Law, in THE USES OF SOcIOLoGY 81, esp. 91 n. 12 (P. F.
Lazarsfeld ed. 1967).
-
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mendation to the judge, for the other group they made no recommendation and simply left the judge to his own traditional guide lines as to
whether or not to set bail. Thus, both judicial integrity and the random
requirements of the controlled experiments were preserved.
In those cases where the judges received a recommendation, the rate
of release without bail was four times as high as in the control group
which was under the traditional bail procedure. Yet, on the appointed
day in court, the proportion of defendants who willfully failed to appear
was the same in both groups. The situation was similar in what to date
is clearly still the most important indirect legal experiment. When it
became doubtful that pre-trial of civil law suits-appearances notwithstanding-resulted in a higher settlement ratio, the state courts of New
Jersey cooperated in a controlled experiment designed to test the issue.
But a direct test, which would exclude some cases altogether from
pre-trial while making it obligatory for others, was considered improper.
Thus, an indirect design was developed in which the control group
came under obligatory pre-trial, and the experimental group under
optional pre-trial if at least one of the litigants asked for it.
Although only 43 per cent of the cases in the optional group were
pre-tried, none of the applied yardsticks (settlement ratio, duration of
trial, etc.) showed any significant difference between experimental and
control group. Since pre-trial costs time and money, the experiment
6
established optional pre-trial as clearly superior to obligatory pre-trial.
Finally, there is a third legal indirect experiment to report on. The
Federal District Court in Chicago wanted to find out whether the so7
called split trial procedure would save trial time for the court. That

rule allows the court to initially limit in a jury trial the litigation and
the jury's verdict to the issue of liability. If the jury finds no liability,
this ends the trial. If it does find liability, the issue of damages is litigated and adjudicated in a sequel of the first trial, before the same jury.
The ideal experiment to test this issue would be to have a random
half of cases tried under the split rule, the other half under regular
procedure, and see by how much, if at all, the split trials are shorter
than the regular ones. Such an experiment would involve something like
a judge's tossing a coin to decide under which rule each case is to be
tried.
6.

See M.

ROSENBERG, THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUsTICE

Also H. Zeisel, Optional vs. Obligatory Pre-trialin 4 TRIAL 11 (Jan. 1968).
7. See DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 2, at 99.
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Suffice it to say that such a suggestion was not even made. But
there was no need to abandon the experiment altogether. The problem
was how to redesign it so that judicial discretion would not be interfered with.
This was done by simply allowing each judge to make his own decisions, case by case, as to which rule to apply. One could allow this
without destroying the controlled character of the experiment because
the court assigned the filed cases randomly among its judges, hence the
cases assigned to each judge constituted comparable random units.
The judges obliged the analysts by applying the split trial rule with
different frequencies, thereby making it possible to see whether any
relationship existed between split trial rule and length of trial.
PER CENT SEPARATION AND TRIAL TIME*
Average Trial Time
(days)

Per Cent Separation
* Judges with more than 14 cases

* Simplified, from H. Zeisel and Th. Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving:
A Statistical Analysis, 78 HARv. L lxv. 1606, 1615 (1963).
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The more frequently a judge made use of the split trial rule, the
shorter, on the average, the time he required for a trial. Moreover, the
judges happened to group nicely around a regression line, enabling us
to conclude tentatively, that the split trial would save, on the average,
the difference between 3.8 and 3.0 trial days, or roughly some 20 per
cent of the trial time.8
What then can we say in general about the indirect experiment?
It makes experimentation possible where the direct design would run
into legal or other obstacles. It achieves this goal by abandoning direct
control over the variable to be tested.
By making this change, it runs the risk that those who now control
the variable will not effectively differentiate between control and experimental group: the smokers who either do or do not give up smoking, the
judge who either does or does not follow the Vera recommendation, the
litigants who either do or do not opt for pre-trial, the judge who either
does or does not apply the split trial rule. If, for instance, all judges
would have applied the split trial rule with equal frequency, or if all
litigants would have opted for pre-trial-there would have been no
experiment.
Furthermore, by abandoning the direct control, the tested issue may
be blunted, although it need not always be that way. Often it will leave
no way of measuring the effect of the variable directly. This is but
another way of saying that every indirect experiment can be reformulated as a directly controlled experiment with a somewhat different
objective: e.g., instead of experimenting with release without bail,
Vera experimented with recommending release without bail, instead
of experimenting with non-smoking, our hypothetical researcher would
experiment with persuading not to smoke, etc.
But the possibility of such reformulation must not be permitted to
obscure the very distinct features of the indirect experiment: a compromise design that makes it possible to obtain some measure of a
variable which otherwise could not be measured at all.
-HANS

ZEisEL

8. The result was corroborated by another important finding that explained it:
that in one third of all cases the verdict against liability obviated litigation of the
damages; and where liability was found, the parties were as a rule quick to settle the
damages without further trial.
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